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Municipal Infrastructure Spending Capacity in South 
Africa: A Panel Smooth Transition Regression Approach  




This paper assesses the factors that contribute to underspending of the capital budget at the local 
government level by making use of a nonlinear model based on the panel smooth transition 
regression (PSTR) model. South Africa is used as a case study.  Capital transfer is identified as an 
important threshold variable in that the degree to which municipalities spend their capital budget 
depends on a threshold determined by capital transfer. The results of the empirical analysis show  
that large amounts of capital transfers to local government contribute to underspending by 
municipalities in South Africa.  Moreover, the results indicate that capital budget spending could 
be improved by ensuring that the trade-off between the current budget and capital budget is 
reduced, increasing the fiscal capacity of municipalities, which gives them financial autonomy to 
































1. INTRODUCTION  
A number of studies have alluded to the importance of public infrastructure, be it for contributing 
to economic growth, curtailing unemployment or reducing poverty and inequality. Examples of 
such studies include the ground-breaking work of Aschauer (1989) and earlier works of Munnell 
(1992), Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) and Lau and Sin (1997). Later works include those of 
Calderón and Servén (2003), Jung and Thorbecke (2003), Adam and Bevan (2003), Estache, 
Perrault, and Savard (2009), Savard (2010); and studies specifically on South Africa include 
Fedderke and Bogetic (2009), Maisonnave, et al. (2013) and Mbanda and Chitiga-Mabugu (2017). 
Arguments for increasing public infrastructure spending commonly include social and economic 
benefits. Public infrastructure investment results in improvements in factor productivity, which 
promotes growth, increases employment and addresses existing and potential future infrastructure 
bottlenecks. Public infrastructure investment improves infrastructural services and improves 
developmental indicators such as access to electricity and clean energy, health, education, access 
to sanitation and safe water and transport services.  
 
Significant progress in expanding access to services to previously disadvantaged communities, 
especially extending access to electricity, has been made in South Africa. However, public 
infrastructure remains inadequate and service delivery backlogs persist. The NPC (2011) asserts 
that the core national economic infrastructure is relatively good, but for many South Africans, 
particularly poor and peri-urban communities, access to basic services such as electricity, 
sanitation, safe water, public transport and telecommunications remains a challenge. The 2011 
Census data shows that only 73.4% of the population have access to piped water inside a dwelling 
and only 71.4% have access to sanitation (National Treasury, 2013a). Access to electricity, 
according to the World Bank (2013), was 75.8% in 2010, far below that of South Africa’s peers, 
like Brazil (98.7%), China (99.7%) and upper middle-income countries (97.4%). The NPC (2012) 
notes that municipalities, which distribute roughly 50% of South Africa’s electricity, not only have 
inadequate investments in infrastructure but have maintenance and repairs backlogs exceeding R35 
billion. Inadequate investment accompanied by expanded access to infrastructure and ineffective 
operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure, hinder economic performance and results in 
prohibitive costs that make the services unaffordable to the poor (NPC, 2012; National Treasury, 
2013a). 
 
The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) (2012) points out that upon their 
establishment, municipalities inherited worn-out infrastructure, some of which was more than 30 
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years old and in need of replacement, which required massive investments. In addition, SALGA 
(2012) mentions, municipalities had to provide infrastructure services to a substantial part of the 
population that previously had no basic infrastructure provision. Faced with these two challenges, 
the new government’s policy response was to prioritise provision of infrastructure to the 
population that was not previously served instead of repairing and replacing existing infrastructure 
for the benefit of a few (SALGA, 2012). 
 
Municipal capital spending is used for the provision of municipal infrastructure, which includes 
municipalities’ electricity, roads systems, water reticulation, storm water and sewerage (National 
Treasury, 2011). Through capital expenditure, municipalities can achieve greater access to basic 
infrastructure and services which helps combat poverty more effectively (National Treasury, 2011). 
Thus, the main policy instruments to achieve infrastructure provision targets by municipalities are 
budgets and municipal infrastructure grants (Josie, 2008). 
 
In many parts of the world the main constraint to providing adequate infrastructure is budgetary 
pressures and difficult access to financing, which sometimes prompts officials to scale back, delay, 
or cancel projects (Arimah, 2005; Copeland, et al., 2011). In South Africa, even though resources 
are not unlimited as in many African countries, the problem is rather different. As pointed out by 
the World Bank, the chief constraint to delivery of infrastructure investment initiatives, “has been 
capacity to spend, rather than the resources themselves” (World Bank, 2009, p. 7).  
 
Spending capacity on capital or the infrastructure budget is one of the major challenges faced by 
municipalities in South Africa (Alexander, 2015). To discourage underspending, budgeted funds 
for infrastructure investment that are not spent are returned to the fiscus at the end of the financial 
year, or the underspending municipalities get reduced budgets in the subsequent year (National 
Treasury, 2015; Capricorn District Municipality, n.d.). The problem is that such downward fiscal 
adjustments can diminish the gains from government investments and contribute to economic 
growth slowdown (Leeper, Walker & Yang, 2010). Thus, underspending can compromise the 
effective provision of infrastructural services in South Africa.  
 
The 2012 budget speech acknowledged that the state’s infrastructure capacity was hampered by 
several weaknesses (Gordhan, 2012). Low levels of infrastructure spending may be due to various 
reasons, including skills shortages, problems in planning and implementation and delays in project 
take-off. National Treasury (2013b) alleges that for South African municipalities these factors 
include poorly prepared budgets, weak revenue management, over-ambitious capital programmes 
and non-priority spending, which is driven by the operating budget. As a result of such constraints, 
not only is planned aggregate infrastructure spending below the desired level (Mokgabudi, 2013), 
but actual infrastructure spending falls short of the budgeted amounts. The weaknesses have an 
impact on infrastructure spending to the extent that actual spending can be as low as 68% of the 
planned spending, as happened in the 2010/11 budget year.  
 
The South African case seems to be reminiscent of Von Hirschhausen’s view that “efficient 
infrastructure policies are much more easily ‘planned’ than actually carried out” (1999, p. 428). 
This points to the importance of implenting plans rather than having remarkable plans that are 
not fully carried out. The problem of underspending the infrastructure budget is not new in South 
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Africa. It is acknowledged both in academic and policy circles. Surprisingly, there is a lack of 
empirical studies, particularly from a local government perspective, on what determines the level 
of capital budget spending across municipalities.  
 
A number of studies have, in one way or another, analysed the capacity to spend by subnational 
government. Arimah (2005) asserts that a municipality’s financial capacity and the macroeconomic 
environment in which it operates are among the factors that explain differences in the level of 
infrastructure spending across cities in developing countries and emerging economies. Similarly, 
Mathew and Moore (2011) find that fiscal capacity is positively related to capacity to spend 
transfers from central government, in the case of the Bihar State of India. In a study of Italian 
municipalities Anessi-Pessina, Sicilia and Steccolini (2012) note that underspending is positively 
related to rigidity and adjustments in the current budget, but negatively related to financial 
autonomy. 
 
Another important variable is the level of income received in the form of transfers, which is 
believed to be an important factor in affecting the fiscal behaviour of a recipient (Shah, 2007). In 
practice, intergovernmental transfers can have a significantly positive impact on local level capital 
spending capacity (Lewis, 2013) and related capital expenditure (Litschig & Morrison, 2013; 
Arvate, et al., 2015). However, in other instances transfers may have an insignificant impact on 
grant recipient’s spending, as pointed out by Gamkhar and Shah (2007). There appears to be no 
consistency in the debate on the impact of transfers on local government spending capacity of the 
capital budget. This inconsistency could be explained by the existence of a nonlinear relationship 
(Odawara, 2010) between the level of transfers and capital spending capacity. While transfers are 
an important source of income, particularly from central government, there is a possibility that 
they may affect the capacity to spend in an undesirable way. Transfers are likely to benefit the 
recipient local government up to a certain level, beyond which diseconomies of scale set in. This 
line of thinking is supported by Prud’homme (2003) who looks at the threshold impact of transfers 
on raising local taxes. Prud'homme (2003) observes that municipalities that receive up to a certain 
threshold in transfers per capita raise more average per capita taxes than when transfers exceed 
the threshold. Likewise, one would not expect capital transfers from central and provincial 
government to local government to have an infinitely positive impact on the capacity to spend the 
capital budget in South Africa. 
 
To study the capital budget spending capacity among South African municipalities, this study 
builds on the work of Arimah (2005), Mathew and Moore (2011) and Anessi-Pessina, Sicilia and 
Steccolini (2012) that assessed factors explaining the capacity to spend the municipal capital 
budget. However, we go a step further by adopting a non-linear methodology in order to assess 
the possibility of a threshold effect existing between transfers and capital budget spending capacity. 
Thus, our study uses panel data analysis, particularly the panel smooth transition regression (PSTR) 
model to establish the factors that explain the spending capacity of municipalities in terms of the 
level of municipal capital budget spending in South Africa, taking into account the threshold effect 
of capital transfers on capital budget spending capacity. To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
study has addressed the issue of threshold effects when analysing municipal capital budget 




The remainder of the paper is structured as follows; section 2 discusses the spending capacity of 
South African municipalities, section 3 presents the literature review. Section 4 explains the 
methodology used. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the paper and section 6 
concludes the paper.  
2. SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPALITIES CAPITAL SPENDING  
Municipalities use a mix of revenue sources to fund their capital expenditure. These include own 
revenues, market credit and intergovernmental transfers, mainly in the form of conditional grants 
(Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2014). Municipal own revenue contributions to capital 
infrastructure investments are limited, resulting in municipal infrastructure being increasingly 
funded by intergovernmental transfers (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2014). According to 
National Treasury (2011), high levels of municipal capital spending are largely driven by national 
government transfers to address backlogs in service delivery.  
2.1. Spending Capacity of the Capital Budget 
Wall, Watermeyer and Pirie (2012) point out that for many years the National Treasury has 
grappled every year with the challenge of the inability of a number of municipalities to spend their 
entire capital budgets. Unspent capital budgets reflect undelivered services (Wall, et al., 2012). 
Murwamuila and Lethoko (2014) concur, pointing out that capital budget underspending can affect 
the ability to carry out programmes and deliver services. Despite the government having in place 
measures such as delaying, withholding or even stopping transfers to curb underspending by 
municipalities, as outlined in the Department of Provincial and Local Government (2006), the 
problem of underspending persists. With such punitive measures in place, every municipality 
would be expected not to underspend. However, this is not the case, and the question that needs 
to be answered then is: what are the determinants  of municipal capital budget spending? This 
paper aims to make a contribution to answering that.  
 
Underspending is not as pronounced at national and provincial government levels as it is at the 
local level, particularly the infrastructure budget. According to National Treasury (2014) in 
2012/13 the national and provincial governments underspent their adjusted budgets by 0.6% and 
1.9% respectively, but municipalities spent only 84.6% of their infrastructure grants (up from 
78.5% the previous year).  
 
 
Table 1: Municipal Categories 
 
Category Number Description 
Metros 81 Metropolitan municipalities 
Secondary cities (B1) 19 All local municipalities referred to as secondary cities 
                                            
 
1 Prior to 2011 there were six metros and 21 secondary cities, and these numbers changed when Buffalo 
City and Mangaung were categorised as metropolitan municipalities in 2011.   
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Large towns (B2) 29 All local municipalities with an urban core. There is huge variation in population sizes among these 
municipalities and they do have large urban populations. 
Small towns (B3) 111 Characterised by:  
 no large town as a core urban settlement  
 relatively small population, a significant proportion of which is urban and based in one or more small 
towns  
Largely agricultural-based local economies: 
 rural areas in this category are characterised by the presence of commercial farms  
Mostly rural (B4) 70 Characterised by the presence of at most one to two small towns in their areas, communal land tenure 
and villages or scattered groups of dwellings and typically located in former homelands 
Districts (C1) 25 District municipalities that are not water service providers 
Districts (C2) 21 District municipalities that are water service providers 
Source: (National Treasury, 2011; National Treasury, 2013b) 
2.2. Key Municipalities  
While municipal infrastructure demand spans all municipalities, it is highest in metros and 
secondary cities  (National Treasury, 2011). In addition, this group of municipalities, 27 in total, 
accounts for the largest share of national economic activity, around 80%, according to the World 
Bank (2009). South African municipalities are grouped into seven categories, as shown in  
Table 1. The categorisation is based on a number of factors, which include the proportion of poor 
households and the share of households with infrastructure services of electricity, water and 
sanitation (National Treasury, 2011).  The importance of the 27 top metros is further highlighted 
in terms of their level of capital expenditure. In total, this group of municipalities accounts for 
about 70% of all municipal capital expenditure, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Municipal Capital Expenditure, R1000 
 
Municipality Group 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Metros 11 268 969 17 018 685 25 437 342 22 702 154 
Top 21 3 337 304 4 296 708 6 559 667 6 108 148 
Districts 2 078 486 2 462 794 3 455 938 4 803 502 
B2 1 398 499 1 847 472 1 885 852 2 134 725 
B3 1 819 811 2 340 264 2 522 034 2 726 827 
B4 1 406 996 1 992 201 1 808 532 2 463 395 
Total 21 310 065 29 958 124 41 669 365 40 938 752 
Metros and Top 21 (% of total) 69 71 77 70 
Source: National Treasury (2011) 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Amounts of capital spending at the local government level are fairly large but, as asserted by Bates 
and Santerre (2015), only a few studies have researched on the main factors influencing the level 
of capacity to spend on local government capital infrastructure programmes. Among other factors, 
previous studies attribute spending capacity by government to a number of factors, which include 
the inadequate fiscal capacity of the underspending entities (Mathew & Moore, 2011), financial 
autonomy (Anessi-Pessina, et al., 2012; Bach, Blöchliger and Wallau), rigidity (Anessi-Pessina, et 
al., 2012), low absorption of transfers and poor control in budget implementation (Khasiani, 2007), 
as well as incapability to utilise additional resources, especially transfers, owing to insufficiency of 
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the technical capacities that are typically necessary for investment projects (Aragón & Casas, 2008). 
Below a review of studies that in one way or another looked at factors that contribute to local 
government underspending is done.  
 
Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, the Ugandan Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development (MoFPED) (2011) carries out a study to establish and evaluate factors 
that constrain and undermine effective use of public funds at all levels of government in Uganda. 
MoFPED (2011) notes that a number of government units had consistently failed to use up their 
cash balances, which had a serious impact on public infrastructure investment and service delivery. 
Most of the underspending, MoFPED (2011) noted, was more significant in local government and 
reflected failure to implement planned activities. MoFPED (2011) cites poor planning as the sole 
chief absorption constraint. 
 
Mathew and Moore (2011) assess factors that explain state incapacity in the Bihar State of India. 
Using a Panel Corrected Standard Errors regression model, Mathew and Moore (2011) analyse the 
determinants of capacity to spend transfers from central government, the Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes, by the Bihar State in comparison to the spending capacity by states with comparable 
income levels. They specified capacity to spend as a function of capacity to collect taxes by the 
state government, deficit (the Gross Fiscal Deficit of the state government as a percentage of state 
GDP), percentage of the state’s rural poor, agriculture share (percentage contribution of the 
agricultural sector to state GDP), and election, which is a dummy variable to indicate whether a 
national parliament or general election to the state assembly had taken place in the year in question 
(Mathew & Moore, 2011). The results show that the capacity to collect taxes (as a measure of a 
state’s fiscal capacity) is positively related to spending capacity, while the percentage of poor people 
is negatively related to spending capacity (Mathew & Moore, 2011). According to Mathew and 
Moore (2011), the results indicate that richer states perform relatively better in terms of spending 
capacity. 
 
Arimah (2005) assesses determinants of variations in infrastructure spending across cities in Africa, 
Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East and economies in transition. Arimah (2005) 
argues that results indicate that differences in infrastructure spending are due to variations in 
municipal governments’ financial capacity, urban growth rate, macroeconomic environment and 
quality of governance. Arimah’s (2005) findings suggest that infrastructure spending across 
developing countries cities are explained by variations in the city governments’ financial capacity, 
macroeconomic environment, quality of governance and urban growth rate. Similar to arguments 
by Arimah (2005) on financial capacity, Bach et al. (2009, p. 5) argue that autonomy indicators 
could help explain sub-central spending power. Bach et al. (2009) point out that it is not only the 
budget autonomy that affects the spending power of sub-central governments; other aspects such 
as policy autonomy, input autonomy and output autonomy also play important roles. These factors 
determine the extent to which local governments have control over (i) major policy objectives and 
key aspects of service delivery, (ii) salaries, management of staff and tender processes, (iii) 
standards of service (like deciding on what capital investment project to undertake) and (iv) 




In concurrence with Bach et al. (2009) and Arimah (2005), Anessi-Pessina et al. (2012) regard 
financial autonomy as a determinant of municipal spending capacity. Using a between-effects 
model and a fixed-effects model to analyse the main determinants of both current and capital 
spending among Italian municipalities, Anessi-Pessina et al. (2012) specify financial autonomy 
(measured as [tax revenues plus fee revenues]/total current revenues) as one of the explanatory 
variables. The other independent variables include staff size, current surplus/deficit, expenditure 
rigidity (calculated as [personnel plus interest expenditures]/total current revenue) as well as local 
socioeconomic conditions (such as geographic area, local economic conditions). For capital 
spending, Anessi-Pessina et al. (2012) observe that underspending is positively related to 
adjustments in the current budget and rigidity, but negatively related to financial autonomy. That 
is, municipalities with financial autonomy have spending capacity and are likely not to underspend 
their capital budget, while those that lack spending capacity are likely to underspend. Likewise, 
rigidity and adjustments in current spending are associated with inability to spend the municipal 
capital budget. 
 
A panel data study using Odinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation for the period 2001 to 2010 by 
Bates and Santerre (2015) on the determinants of local public capital spending among Connecticut 
towns and cities confirms the importance of intergovernmental grants as factor explaining capital 
budget spending. Prud’homme (2003) assumes that transfers have a threshold effect on local 
government performance. The author relies on descriptive statics to reach such a conclusion.  
 
This paper make use a nonlinear econometric technique, the PSTR model, to investigate the extent 
to which the level of capital transfers to municipalities explains their capacity to spend the 
infrastructure budget, an angle that has not been explored before in the analysis of local 
government spending capacity.  
4. METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Model Specification: Panel Smooth Transition Regression model 
The above studies are important in highlighting various factors affecting subnational government’s 
capacity to spend; however, they all rely on traditional OLS estimation. As pointed out by 
Karagianni and Pempetzoglou (2009), conclusions based on linear tests alone are weak and limited. 
Non-linear estimation, on the other hand, can uncover significant non-linearities existing in the 
relationships between economic variables (Hiemstra & Jones, 1994). Our study seeks to assess if 
a non-linear relationship exists between transfers and municipal capital spending capacity. To 
accommodate the possibility of different impacts of transfers on municipal capital spending we 
rely on Gonz´alez, Teräsvirta and van Dijk’s (2005) PSTR model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽1
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
′𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑔(𝑞𝑖𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝑖=1,…,𝑁 denote the cross-section and 𝑡=1,…,𝑇 denote the time dimension of the panel. 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 (capital spending) is a scalar, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the 𝑘-dimensional vector of time-
varying independent variables (transfers, staff, curexp, aut), 𝜇𝑡 represents the fixed individual effects 
and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents independent identically distributed errors. The transition function 𝑔(𝑞𝑖𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) 
is a continuous function of the observable variable 𝑞𝑖𝑡 bounded between 0 and 1. 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is the 
9 
 
threshold variable (transfers), which is usually one of the explanatory variables. The slope parameter 
𝛾 is an indicator of the smoothness of the transition between 0 and 1. 𝑐 is the threshold parameter 
denoting where the transition takes place. The extreme values of the transition function, 0 and 1, 
are respectively associated with coefficients 𝛽1
′  and (𝛽1
′ + 𝛽2
′ ). The value of 𝑔(𝑞𝑖𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) is 
determined by 𝑞𝑖𝑡. 
The transition function, as given by Gonz´alez et al., (2005), takes the logistic function: 
𝑔(𝑞𝑖𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) =
1




with 𝛾 > 0 and 𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐2 ≤. . . ≤ 𝑐𝑚; where 𝑐𝑗 = (𝑐1. . . 𝑐𝑚)
′ is a vector of m-dimensional location 
parameters and 𝛾 > 0 and 𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐2 ≤. . . ≤ 𝑐𝑚 restrictions are imposed for purposes of 
identification. Gonz´alez, et al. (2005) point out that it is generally sufficient to consider 𝑚 = 1 or 
𝑚 = 2 because these values allow for types of variations in the parameters that are commonly 
encountered.  
For 𝑚 = 1, the model denotes that the two extreme regimes are linked to low and high values of 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 with the coefficients changing monotonically from 𝛽1 to 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 as 𝑞𝑖𝑡 increases, with the 
transition centred around 𝑐1. 
4.2. Estimation and specification tests 
Estimation of the PSTR model entails the following three-step procedure: 
i. Test for linearity against the PSTR model 
ii. Test for the number of regimes in the transition function 
iii. Parameters estimation 
These three steps have been comprehensively discussed by Gonz´alez, et al. (2005) Chakroun 
(2010), Kadilli and Markov (2012), Seleteng, et al. (2013), Thanh (2015), Majoul and Daboussi 
(2016) and Chiang, et al. (2017).  
 
The linearity test uses the LM test, the F-version LMF and LR to identify the key variable that 
explains the nonlinearity of 𝑞𝑖𝑡 (capital spending capacity). First, a linear model is tested against a 
single threshold model. If the test rejects the null hypothesis of linearity, it means at least one 
regime exists. Second, when linearity is rejected, a test to confirm no remaining non-linearity in 
the transition function is conducted. This entails testing the existence of a single threshold model 
against the existence of a double threshold model. The process is carried out until the null 
hypothesis of no additional threshold is not rejected. If the null hypothesis is not rejected for the 
test of a single threshold model against a double threshold model, it means only a single regime 
exists. Lastly, after eliminating the individual effects, model parameters are estimated by applying 
the non-linear least squares (NLS). 
4.3. Data  
We use a panel data set of 27 South African district municipalities over a seven-year period from 
2004 to 2010. Our analysis is based on municipal budget data sourced from the National Treasury. 
Transfers is regarded as the threshold variable, because literature shows a possibility that the 
impact of transfers on capital budget spending capacity could be influenced by the level of 
transfers. Table 3 presents the type of variables used. It is important to note that  variables such 
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as indebtedness, population density and Gross Value Added were considered as explanatory 
variables but dropped from the final estimation because they were not statistically significant.  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics presents the descriptive statistics. For the top 27 municipalities in 
South Africa, it shows that between 2004 and 2010, on average the municipalities spent 82% of 
their revised capital budget. The minimum recorded was 22% for Matjhabeni Municipality in 2004 









Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Max Min Std. dev 
kexp 0.82 2.88 0.22 0.38 
currentexp  1.04 1.53 0.47 0.145 
kbudgetchange 1.66 4.84 0.08 0.85 
lnstaff 12.80 15.57 11.15 1.17 
autonomy 0.81 1.00 0.43 0.10 
lntransfers 11.52 14.96 5.64 1.42 
Source: Author’s representation of estimation results 
 
The correlation matrix, given in Table 4, shows the bivariate links between all variables used in the 
model. It is important in indicating whether there might be a possibility of multicollinearity. There 
is only a single correlation coefﬁcient above 0.8, which might not cause problems by itself. The 
results also suggest that capital budget spending is negatively related to capital budget change and 
positively related to the rest of the variables. 
 
Table 4: Correlation coefficients of variables used in the empirical analysis 
 
 kexp currentexp  kbudgetchange lntransfers Lnstaff autonomy 
kexp 1      
currentexp  0.002059 1     
kbudgetchange -0.37465 0.018316 1    
lntransfers 0.091487 -0.1116 -0.111732 1   
lnstaff 0.128265 0.002059 -0.242401 0.8208844 1  
autonomy 0.101211 0.002059 -0.155601 -0.39411 -0.04144 1 
Source: Author’s representation of estimation results 
 
To ensure that we do not run spurious regressions which give meaningless results, we conduct 
unit root tests on the variables used in our estimation to ascertain whether they are stationary. A 
Type Variable Description 
Dependent 
variable 




Transfers Capital grants to municipalities from higher levels of government 
Independent 
variables 
Staff Total spending on staff - used as a proxy for size and complexity 
Currentexp Current spending budget outcome as a percentage of the revised budget 
Autonomy Financial autonomy (share of current revenues accounted for by own taxes and fees) 
Kbudgetchange % change between the initial budget and the previous year’s budget outcomes (initial 
as % of previous year outcome) 
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non-stationary variable indicates non-existence of any long-run relationship between the respective 
variable and other variables.  
 
Table 5: Panel unit root tests 
 
 LLC t*-stat IPS W-stat 
 Levels (P-value) Differences (P-value) Levels (P-value) Differences (P-value) 
kexp -10.1 (0.000) -14 (0.000) -2.5 (0.006) -4.9 (0.000) 
currentexp  -9.8 (0.000) -18.8 (0.000) -2.9 (0.002) -6.2 (0.000) 
kbudgetchange -12.7 (0.000) -16.4 (0.000) -12.7 (0.000) -4.6 (0.000) 
lntransfers -11.2 (0.000) -13.1 (0.000) -1.2 (0.106) -3.7 (0.000) 
lnstaff 9.9 (1.000) -15.3 (0.000) 8.3 9.9 (1.000) -3.7 (0.000) 
autonomy -19.2 (0.000) -13.2 (0.000) -2.8 (0.002) -2.8 (0.002) 
Source: Author’s representation of estimation results 
 
We rely on the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) and Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) unit root tests to test 
the stationarity of our variables. Table 5 presents the panel unit root tests. Both the LLC and IPS 
indicate that all our variables are stationary, except lnstaff which becomes stationary in first 
differences.  
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1. Linearity tests results 
 
Table 6: Linearity and no remaining non-linearity results 
 Threshold variable is not part the set of the explanatory variables 
 Wald Tests (LM) Fisher Tests (LMF) LRT Tests (LRT) 
H0: Linear Model H1: PSTR 
with r = 1   
15.435 (0.004) 3.513 (0.009) 16.102 (0.000) 
H0: PSTR with r = 1 against H1: PSTR 
with at least r = 2 
4.198 (0.380) 0.852 (0.495) 4.246 (0.374) 
Source: Author’s representation of estimation results 
 
Table 6 gives the linearity tests results which indicate that all three tests reject, at the 1% 
significance level, the null hypothesis of a linear model against the alternative of a logistic (m=1) 
PSTR model. This implies a nonlinear relationship between capital budget spending capacity and 
transfers received by municipalities in South Africa. 
For the test for no remaining non-linearity, the null hypothesis of the logistic specification (m = 
1) against the exponent one (m = 2) PSTR model, the results show that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. The implication is that the model has only one threshold level of transfers separating 
two regimes of capital budget spending capacity for South African municipalities.  
5.2. Estimation results  
Table 7 presents the estimated model parameters for the existence of threshold value. Considering 
transfers as the transition variable to estimate factors affecting municipal capacity to spend the 
capital budget, indeed our model robustly detects nonlinearity. Our findings are in line with the 
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theory on the existence of a threshold beyond which the impact of fiscal policy changes as pointed 
out by Prud’homme (2003) in the case of the impact of transfers on the collection of taxes. The 
threshold is reached at the natural log of transfers = 10.1055, which is converted to R24 343 009 
(capital transfers). Therefore, the results indicate that the estimated threshold value of capital 
transfers is R24 343 009 and the transition parameter slope is 5.99. The value of the slope, 5.99, 
implies a relatively gradual transition from a low transfers regime to a high transfers regime. This 
suggests that higher levels of government reconsider increasing capital transfers when they near 
or exceed the estimated threshold. The results indicate that the spending capacity of the capital 
budget by South African municipalities could be improved by managing the capital transfers they 
receive.  
 
Transfers received by municipalities could possibly be too high for certain municipalities’ capacity 
to spend, resulting in them being unable to spend the entire capital expenditure budget. This could 
be as a result of the important role of municipalities being recognised by fiscal policy, as evidenced 
by the continued rapid growth of transfers to local government (National Treasury, 2011). 
Consistent growth in transfers to local government has been observed since the inclusion of local 
government in the process of division of revenue in 1999 (National Treasury, 2011). Transfers 
from the national budget, National Treasury (2011) points out, are dependent on the capacity of 
municipalities to raise revenue, but independent of their capacity to spend. As a result, 
municipalities with low fiscal capacity receive a higher proportion relative to those with a high 
fiscal capacity.  
 
Table 7: Parameter estimates for the final PSTR  
 
Variable 𝛽1 𝛽2 
Currentexp 2.1213***  
(2.7350)   
-2.4568***  
(-2.7883) 
Autonomy 2.6340*  
(1.7740)    
-3.1881**  
(-2.1421) 
lnStaff -0.6463***  
(-2.6549)    
0.4593**  
(2.4483) 
Kbudgetchange -0.2211*  
(-1.8206)    
0.1459  
(1.1564) 




Source: Author’s representation of modelling results 
The t-statistics for coefficients in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
 
All coefficients are statistically significant in both regimes, except capital budget change 
(Kbudgetchange) in the high transfers regime. Current expenditure is positively (negatively) related to 
capital budget spending capacity in the lower (higher) transfers regime. Current expenditure 
(Currentexp), is positively (negatively) related to Kexp in the lower (higher) transfers regime. This 
finding is similar to that of Anessi-Pessina et al. (2012). This result indicates that municipalities are 
likely to adjust both capital and current expenditure in the same direction. However, for the higher 
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transfers regime model Currentexp is negatively related to Kexp, implying a trade-off between the 
two variables. This indicates an adjustment of the budget away from capital spending to current 
spending. 
 
Autonomy is positively (negatively) related to capital budget spending capacity in the lower (higher) 
transfers regime. The positive relationship between financial autonomy and capacity to spend the 
capital budget is similar to findings by Arimah (2005). It entails that as the municipal share of own 
revenue increases, spending of the capital budget also increases under the lower transfers regime. 
This means the higher these revenue sources, the greater the ability of municipalities to finance 
infrastructure, thus the lower the levels of transfers. However, in the higher transfers regime 
Autonomy is negatively related to capital budget spending capacity, a finding similar to that of 
Anessi-Pessina et al. (2012). This implies that municipalities that experience a sudden increase in 
own revenue find themselves with higher incomes, which they are unable to spend. The 
implication is that for municipalities whose financial autonomy suddenly increases, actual capital 
expenditure varies much lower than the revised budget. Such municipalities apparently either do 
not plan their budget well or simply do not have the capacity to implement the revised budget.  
 
Staff, a proxy for the size of the workforce, is negatively (positively) related to capital budget 
spending capacity in the higher (lower) transfers regime. The result implies that in the lower 
transfers regime, as the workforce increases Kexp declines, but in the higher regime further 
increases in the workforce lead to an increase in Kexp.  Kbudgetchange for the lower regime is 
significantly and negatively related to capital budget spending capacity, a result that is in line with 
the findings of a similar study by Anessi-Pessina et al. (2012). This highlights the use of the 
budgeting process as a way of repealing some programmes introduced in the initial budget, which 
more or less reflects realignment of the budget in a particular year to that of the previous year.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The problem of underspending the infrastructure budget, which is acknowledged both in academic 
and policy circles, has been persisting in South Africa. It is central to the provision of local level 
infrastructure, which remains inadequate in many parts of South Africa, particularly at the local 
level. Yet there is a lack of empirical studies, particularly from a local government perspective, 
especially on South Africa, on the factors that explain capital budget underspending. This study 
looked at the factors that contribute to underspending of the capital budget by municipalities in 
South Africa. It investigated whether a nonlinear relationship exists between municipal 
government capital spending and capital transfers from national government for South African 
municipalities. The study employed a PSTR to analyse the threshold effect of capital transfers on 
capacity to spend the planned capital budget. No previous study has analysed the threshold effects 
of municipal capital budget spending. 
 
The threshold effect of capital transfers was estimated through the use of regressors whose 
selection was informed by Arimah (2005), Anessi-Pessina et al (2012) and Mathew and Moore 





First, the results from this analysis confirm evidence of the existence of a nonlinear relationship 
between municipal government capital spending and capital transfers in South Africa. The results 
of the test used to estimate the number of regimes indicate that the model with two regimes or 
one threshold adequately captures this relationship. The threshold capital transfers for South 
African municipalities is R24 477 260. The results suggest that large amounts of capital transfers 
to local government in South Africa are, in some instances, too high for the capacity of some 
municipalities, which explains the persistent underspending of the capital budget. 
 
Second, estimated coefficients of control variables are largely consistent with empirical literature. 
The results indicate that capital budget spending could be improved by ensuring that the trade-off 
between the current budget and capital budget is reduced, increasing the fiscal capacity of 
municipalities which gives them financial autonomy to raise their own revenues, and by increasing 
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